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Abstract The seriousness of the current crisis urgently de-
mands new economic thinking that breaks the austerity vs.
deficit spending circle in economic policy. The core tenet of
the paper is that the most important problems that natural and
social science are facing today are inverse problems, and that
a new approach that goes beyond optimization is necessary.
The approach presented here is radical in the sense that it
identifies the roots in key assumptions in economic theory
such as optimal behavior and stability to provide an inverse
thinking perspective to economic modeling, of use in eco-
nomic and financial stability policy. The inverse problem
provides a truly multidisciplinary platform where related
problems from different disciplines can be studied under a
common approach with comparable results.
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Introduction
The relationship between economic aggregates such as the
unemployment rate or inflation, based on direct measurement
of quantities is an inverse problem which is not well posed.
The inverse problem is to infer the value of parameters of
interest based on the direct measurement of observables. This
form of inference is ill-posed in the sense that solutions to the
problemmay not exist, be multiple or be instable, that is, small
errors in the measurements lead to large differences in the
solution. In order to be able to build on this fundamental but
poorly understood insight we need to critically explore pillars
of orthodox economic theory like the rational expectation
hypothesis, market efficiency and stable equilibrium, provid-
ing new avenues and hands-on alternatives for more realistic
and resilient economic models. More specifically, we claim
that the new generation of economists must be aware of the
necessity to deal with the next three points:
1. Develop a new theoretical framework based on the in-
verse problem theory that will work as a scaffold, where
key topics like stability, causality or predictability in
economic models are addressed.
2. Establish a multidisciplinary program to gather and an-
alyze data relative to cognitive and ecological features of
interest for economic system modeling.
3. Develop new modeling techniques; mathematical and
computational, including complexity theory tools e.g.,
network analysis to further our understanding of the
mechanisms underlying robustness
Four problems in classical economic modeling
Economies are complex man-made systems where organ-
isms and markets interact according to motivations and prin-
ciples not entirely understood yet. The increasing dissatis-
faction with the postulates of traditional economics i.e. per-
fectly rational agents interacting through efficient and stable
markets, has created new incentives for different approaches
in economics. For example, behavioral economics [1] builds
on cognitive and emotional models of agents, neuroeconomics
[2] addresses the neurobiological basis of valuation of choices,
and evolutionary economics [3] studies economies as a com-
plex evolutionary system, composed of agents that adapt to
endogenous patterns out of equilibrium regions. Social sci-
ence, and in particular economics, is undergoing a decisive
historical moment. A new approach in economic theory able to
palliate the dissatisfaction with core tenets in classical econom-
ics is sorely needed. In what follows we briefly describe four
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problems—agent-economy separation, causality, equilibrium
and perfectly rational maximizers- that need to be specifically
addressed.
Agent-economy separation
Orthodox economic thinking draws a neat line between
agents and the economy they perform. To that effect micro-
economics and macroeconomics are publicized as the suit-
able disciplines to address the issues related to the former
and the last respectively. Samuelson changed forever the
study of economics, which became strongly mathematical
by borrowing methods and insights from statistical physics.
University departments of economics are an institutionalized
embodiment of his vision. However, the idiosyncrasy of
economic systems composed of participants endowed with
cognitive and emotional characteristics clearly calls into
question the analogy between physics and economics. Eco-
nomic agents are not merely reactive but have an anticipatory
nature. Realistic economic systems try to predict the out-
comes of their actions and of those of other agents, and in
doing so they modify the structure itself that they are trying
to cope with or outperform, as in financial markets. The
forward-looking capacity of biological and social systems
is an additional layer of complexity that statistical mechanics
applications lack.
Causality
Econometric models have mainly focused on models of
exchange and allocation, neglecting critical aspects in econ-
omies’ dynamics like production or credit money. This ap-
parent lax approach has its root in modeling economic sys-
tems “as if” [4] having an equivalent ontological status with
the rest of material systems that form the “book of nature that
is written in the language of mathematics”, as Galileo poet-
ically stated. However, the “unreasonable effectiveness of
mathematics in physics” relies upon the existence of invari-
ance principles, observed in quantities that remain constant
regardless the system’s motion [5]. Economies are not con-
servative systems, assets are created ex novo, as in the
process of money creation through credit; and disappear,
enacted by the innovative entry of new technologies. This
is the disruptive force that sustains economic growth or
Schumpeter’s “creative destruction” [6]. Thus, variance prin-
ciples and general laws in economics are more a desideratum
than a factum. The Lucas critique [7] is still valid, even
though the approaches that followed like dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DGSE) forgo realism for mathematical
virtuosity, macroeconometric models are not invariant to
economic policy, or simply put, a policy experiment may
modify the structural parameters that it is trying to predict.
The causal thinking in economics, which mainly relies on
“the genetic-causal tradition” [8] must be explored with fresh
insight.
Equilibrium
In Newtonian physics and classical thermodynamics the
laws that govern the behavior of single particles suffice for
the study of assemblies of particles, but this “methodological
bonus” comes with a cost, they are theories of equilibrium,
and therefore do not apply to far-from-equilibrium systems.
Equilibrium is a terminal state that is reached when all
process have stopped. Biological and social systems are open
systems that transition between different regimes, so non-
stationarity and volatility have to be taken into account. The
participants in economic systems are heterogeneous. They
are equipped with different informational processing capa-
bilities, different systems of belief and ways to internalize
the world. Thus, their interactions may produce novel
dynamics and patterns whose understanding lie outside
the basic assumptions necessary to establish an equilib-
rium, such as perfect competition or perfect knowledge
of all the participants. Participants in an economy can-
not be merely averaged out as particles in a gas, as they
try to adapt to complex, highly coupled and self-referential
eco-systems. One unique stable equilibrium cannot be taken
for granted, instead multiple equilibria and qualitative regime
shifts are more realistic signatures of economic systems.
Mathematical tractability, which is undoubtedly a good in
itself, should not lead us to overlook this fact. In order to deal
with instability-prone phenomena like increasing returns or
leverage we may need to design new regulatory mechanisms
other than homeostasis-based.
Perfectly rational maximizers
Selfishness is one of the most reliable characteristics of
human beings, but that empirically testable statement does
not preclude other forms of economic interaction. Human
societies are based on large-scale cooperation among genet-
ically unrelated individuals [9]. Darwin recognized early on
that altruistic exchange was problematic for the theory nat-
ural selection. Social norms that favor cooperation should
have been discounted by natural selection due to the reduced
fitness of altruistic individuals. Group selection would en-
dorse communities that contain altruist individuals; this
would qualified cooperative groups for an adaptive advan-
tage over groups of selfish individuals. However, groups
with individuals prone to self-sacrifice for the common good
would attract “free riders” that would join the group to
benefit by the rest of the group without paying any of the
costs. Furthermore if the free rider character were heritable
they would become the fittest transforming an altruistic
group into a parasitic one. Biologists have not reach a
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consensus about the legitimacy of group selection. Cultural
group selection needs also to be considered, as cooperation
in human societies is codified in social norms. Groups that
enforce cooperative norms are more likely to prevail in-
group conflicts [10]. Thus, human behavior can not be re-
duced to individual fitness maximization, they also cooper-
ate in different ways, including reciprocal altruism [11],
punishment-based altruism [12], reputation based altruism
[13, 14], etc.
The egalitarian assumption that all the participants in an
economic system are utility maximizers has a practical mo-
tivation; it likens economic modeling to an optimal problem.
In doing so, no attention is paid to stability because optimal
systems are in general stable [15]. From a control theory
perspective the Keynesian and the Friedman-Lucas ap-
proaches share the idea of the omniscient controller. In a
Keynesian’s stance, the state is the controller that aims to
stabilize the system, and not the mere input as in, for exam-
ple, deficit spending. On the other hand, the Friedman-Lucas
approach relegates the state to a trivial role, that to provide a
constant input e.g. money supply, in order to have n rather
controllers than 1. However, in this decentralized approach,
there is implicitly a controller—the economist- who defines
the objective function: utility maximization, which is typi-
cally the wealth, or even better the logarithm of the wealth.
Orthodox economic policies have a Panglossian view of
economic participants with identical interests competing in
the best possible world, which only exists in textbooks of
macroeconomic modeling. We need to take a more realistic
and honest view: decision makers behavior may largely
deviate from optimal criteria, utility functions may not be
computable, and people may make systematic errors in
predicting the future driving the system to multiple equilibria
and instability.
Criticisms to classical economics
While there is a clear perception at all levels in society that the
world economy is in crisis, the economic predicament of the
Washington consensus—unregulated global free markets- has
not been effectively challenged. The flaws and pitfalls
of classical economics succinctly described in the four
above-mentioned points have been either amended or
criticized from either adherents or critic of the Wash-
ington consensus. For example, causality in financial markets
has been contested by the business magnate Soros with “re-
flexivity”-a two-way feedbackmechanism in which economic
facts e.g. stock prices, shape the agent’s thinking and econom-
ic facts are affected by the agent’s expectations [16]. Alan
Greenspan, ex-chairman of the Federal Reserve of the United
State, once a believer on the obsolescence of economic cycles
in a new era of stable growth driven self regulated free
markets, acknowledged later that this was a flawed belief
[17]. However, new classical economics continue to be ines-
capable in university departments both in teaching and re-
search. Furthermore, global centers of politic and economic
power such as the World Bank or the IMF still endorse a body
of economic theory that promotes minimal government inter-
vention driven by fiscal responsibility and deficit reduction,
mainly by means of spending cuts and consumption tax
increases.
The prevalence of the free market ideology, despite the
pitfalls in classical economic theory and the wide fluctua-
tions that, for example, financial markets engender, cannot
be fully grasped if the political dimension is not taken into
account. A global free market is a political project and not
any natural outcome embedded in an “unstoppable historical
process” such as globalization. For example, the repealing of
the Glass-Steagall act of 1932, removed the firewall that
policy-makers have imposed in the financial industry that
separated commercial and investment banking and success-
fully prevented the occurrence of instabilities. The Gramm–
Leach–Bliley Act of 1999 was officially passed by the
Clinton’s administration to help American banks to compete
in the global markets of capital, transforming the banking
industry into a highly interconnected network extremely
vulnerable to the failure of the important hubs in the banking
network.
Despite the enormous damage of the financial crisis of
2008 effective reforms in the financial system have been
curbed by those with a vested interest in maintaining the
status quo. For example, the banking establishment is well
aware that the government will guarantee bank liabilities of
key credit and insurance institutions whose failure would
certainly provoke a systemic contagion in the entire financial
system, putting in jeopardy the payment system. Thus, the
main bottleneck may not be technical but political [18, 19]. A
strong political will is required to curb the control that “too
big to fail banks” hold on the entire economic system.
Nonetheless, political action in order to be effective and
serve the common good must be informed by up to date
scientific studies. For example, in 2009 one major Spanish
bank was created -with a broad consensus among the parlia-
mentary political groupings- from the conglomeration of
seven small regional saving banks. Some months later the
government nationalized the bank. Were those policy makers
aware of network-based studies of financial contagion, this
could have resulted in a much less harmful outcome for the
taxpayer. As it is shown in [20], the creation of conglomer-
ates of banks, lowers diversity across the system as whole,
and increases the systemic risk of failure.
The field of futures studies –an interdisciplinary research
framework at the intersection of political and social aspects
grounded in physical and life science and engineering- may
play a protagonist role in proposing new avenues and down-
to-earth strategies to reunite the dynamism of capitalism
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(creative destruction driven by technological innovations)
with societal stability.
A new outlook to economic modeling
The core tenet of this work is that the most important prob-
lems that natural and social science are facing today are
inverse problems, and that a new approach that goes beyond
optimization, and takes into account the subjective knowl-
edge of the agent is necessary. The inverse problem is ubiq-
uitous in science; molecular structural reconstruction; meta-
bolic network construction; biomedical imaging reconstruc-
tion of tumors; reconstruction of the internal structure of the
earth; cognitive modeling or option-pricing model in finan-
cial markets, are all examples of the inverse problem.
Inverse thinking
Plato’s famous allegory of the cave provides a poetic expres-
sion of the inverse problem. The only knowledge that men
inside the cave can obtain of real objects, come through
shadows cast upon the walls. This is the inverse problem of
perception [21]. Inverse Problem theory is extracting infor-
mation from indirect measurements.
The general problem of learning or to infer the unknown
causes from the known effects is an inverse problem which
can be studied with either an engineering approach or a
purely statistic one. In the former, the causes are the inputs
of the system and the effects are the outputs, the deviation or
error between the desired output, which is a priori, and the
actual output is feedback via the control system, which is
dedicated to reduce the error. From a statistical standpoint,
input and output data from the training sample that will be
used to infer the model parameters that allow us to make
accurate predictions of future occurrences. The crucial dif-
ference between these two approaches is that in the first case
a model of the system is available and in the second the
model system is missing and needs to be estimated.
To explain, for example, how an increase in interest rate
will cause aggregate demand to decline, we have to study
causality. However we cannot trace linear causal chains in
complex economic systems such as national economies.
Other forms of causality like circular, downward or multiple
causality need to be taken into account. We need to foster an
“inverse thinking” approach to study causality and related
issues e.g. predictability. Predictability can be seen as a
forward model that takes a cause C into an effect E. The
forward problem or modelization allows making predictions
on the value of observables, and the inverse problem uses
those predictions to infer the values of the parameters that
characterize the system. Thus the inverse problem entails the
existence of a forward problem to be inverted. To predict the
value of an observable, for example a system’s output given
its input is a forward problem, and to establish a causal link
between two observables is an inverse problem. The key
aspect of the problem of inference which is an inverse
problem, that is, to infer value parameters based on measure-
ments, resides on being able to make explicit any available a
priori information about the system being modeled.
Causality is an inverse problem and needs to be studied as
such. Thus, very schematically inv(fwd(C))=C′ states that if
C=C′ the inverse problem has an unique solution so we have
a linear causality, otherwise,C≠C′, the inverse problem is ill-
founded because two causes C and C′ produce the same
effect E. Within an inverse thinking approach we don’t try
to solve an inverse problem that is ill-founded, as for exam-
ple in C(interest rate increase) causes E(aggregate demand
decrease), but we collect all the forward models, that is, all
the predictors that are not falsified by data. Thus, we build a
set of possible causes or forward model solutions rather than
one prediction. The rationale behind this manifold approach
to causality is that in order to deal with uncertainty and
volatility we need to have a multiple and adaptable hypoth-
esis scheme.
Inverse thinking challenges the orthodox linear causal
chain of reasoning, as dramatic system disruptions do not
necessarily need large perturbation to occur. The approach is
speculative and Popperian in the sense that proposes axioms
and predictions that can be refuted. The inverse thinking
approach will help to discover the design principles for
robust systems in the face of uncertainty and complexity
[22, 23].
Bio-inspired homeostasis
Conceptual clarification and epistemic discipline in the mis-
use of analogies between physics and economy is a requisite
for developing comprehensible economic knowledge, inde-
pendently of the particular domain in which it is used.
Economies are not mere exchange systems, the transforma-
tion of labor and energy into tangible goods or production is
also part of real economic systems. From a thermodynamic
point of view, the term economic equilibrium is an oxymo-
ron. Equilibrium is a frozen state of no change, where no
macroscopic flows exist. Thus, it is a concept more likely to
apply to closed or isolated systems rather than to real econ-
omies. Among other things, financial crashes have very
acutely showed that the conception of economic equilibrium
based on the mechanical analogy of a pendulum is untenable.
The benefit attained in terms of mathematical tractability by
adopting the hypothesis that economic agents achieve equi-
librium by maximizing utility, must not lead us to neglect
basic facts. Economic agents, value goods and services in
order to take decisions referred to those economic assets in
an attempt to forecast a favorable outcome. But they decide
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so in multiple ways according to ecological and historical
contexts. Moreover, their actions have one direction that
goes from the irreversible past to the uncertain future. Thus,
static equilibrium methods are not applicable to real econo-
mies when these aspects are considered.
Non-equilibrium statistical mechanics may provide a more
fruitful analogy than Gibbs’ theory of equilibrium thermody-
namics [24]. However the concept of non-equilibrium steady
state needs to be carefully addressed as a process that needs to
be maintained by the interplay of non-zero flows of energy or
matter, rather than a final state as equilibrium. Future research
should try to develop scenarios with n different equilibria with
different dynamic regimes. The inverse thinking approach may
provide the necessary mindset to strengthen our understanding
of multiple equilibria, as it natively deals with a scenario of
multiple and instable solutions, including “bubble solutions” or
large deviations from equilibrium. To turn these theoretical
insights into real applications, we need to develop biologically
inspired models of stability mechanisms, in particular homeo-
stasis [25]. A new view of homeostasis that deals with integrat-
ed outcomes rather than single signals is already being promot-
ed in biomedical applications [26]. The notion of stability as a
homeostatic behaviour confinedwithin a static set of admissible
values is here challenged. For example, nervous systems effec-
tively solve an important conundrum: allow synaptic plasticity
without compromising the stability and integrity of the system.
Hebbian learning [27] which is considered the cornerstone of
neural learning is problematic because synapses that are better
than others at activating a neuron, will be strengthen in a
positive feedback loop that reinforce synapsis that are correlated
with neural firing and penalize those that are not. A number of
homeostatic plasticity models have been suggested to compen-
sate for the inherently unstable dynamics that is at the basis of
learning-induced changes in synaptic strength [28]. More re-
cently, the concept of network homeostasis—the coordinated
action of individual regulators in a network- is being developed
[29]. In this view, homeostasis is a highly dynamic process
accomplished by means of coordinated adjustments in network
interconnectivity.
From a futures research perspective, the analogy between
Hebbian learning rules and unregulated capitalism, both
inherently unstable as “the rich get richer”, need to be seri-
ously considered. Economics may be called to act as a
natural bridge able to connect social and technological as-
pects. This positioning may sound extremely risky, the recent
financial meltdown and the inability of the economic models
to forecast these extreme events, has done nothing but
reinforced the old motto “economics is the dismal science”.
Utility
Non-parametric estimators can be arbitrarily well approxi-
mated, this property is called consistency and it is the major
reason for the popularity of model-free estimators. Consis-
tency guarantees that, for a sufficiently big training data set,
it is possible to achieve an optimal performance for any
inference-learning task. Thus, there is apparently a causal
connection between consistency and optimality. However,
non-parametric estimators are optimal because they are con-
sistent, but consistency is an asymptotic property. In real
problems, the training data set cannot be assumed to be
arbitrarily big -data samples may be small or have dispersed
distribution. This point has direct consequences in economic
policy. The standard approach in optimal economic policy,
which is mainly concerned with performing a gradient ascent
on utility or wealth maximization, should be critically
revisited. Modeling all economic systems as optimal utility
maximizers is at least questionable using empirical stan-
dards, as it depends on consistency, which is an asymptotic
property. The Allais’ paradox [30] can be seen as a reflection
of the empirical limitation of using optimal methods when
consistency may not necessarily apply. Indeed the same
person that prefers an apple to an orange, may prefer one
dollar and one orange to one dollar and one apple. The idea
of using an optimization algorithm to forecast people’s
choice as represented in the utility function is untenable
[31]. We need to transcend the idea of one consistent and
optimal criterion for all the participants behavior, proposing
a multifold space of subjective utility models, represented by
a n dimensional set of subjective expected utility (SEU). In
order to take into account how individual SEU maximization
affects and is affected by the aggregate SEU, each SEU is
considered within an ecological perspective. The subjective
expectations utility function (SEU) needs to be defined in
terms of the subjective utility u(x) and the subjective prob-
ability P(x) for a given action x. Thus, the view that is
adopted here goes beyond modeling economic agents as
profit optimizers, to focus on the aggregate level, by study-
ing the dynamics of economic networks of large numbers of
agents equipped with subjective beliefs operating under con-
ditions of uncertainty. It ought to be remarked that SEU
function is a non-convex utility function, so it is not the
same as Bayesian utility maximization.
Economies emerge out of subjective beliefs of agents,
endowed with internalized models that try to adapt to the
aggregate patterns that their actions and expectations create.
The SEU models the looking forward capacity of economic
cognitive agents. By including the cognitive and ecological
dimensions that are the basis of the agent’s behaviour, we
will allow endogeneity in the structure of the inverse prob-
lem and will be in a better disposition to answer questions
regarding which topological architecture is more prone to
systemic failure and gain insight for the design principles to
build more resilient networks.
The inverse problem can be effectively tackled by intro-
ducing all the available information or bias to constrain the
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model space of predictors represented by subjective utility
functions. Bias or a priori knowledge, works as a selection
mechanism over the space of falsifiable models, which in
turn are tested against the data, that is, those that do not
predict data within an established criterion are discarded or
falsified in Popperian parlance. Thus, it is within the inverse
thinking perspective that we can start understanding the
computational goal(s) the economic systems under study.
Discussion
Our zeitgeist is that of deregulation and credit. The political
links of special interest groups were not the only driving
force that pushed economies in this state of affairs. At a more
fundamental level, deregulation can be seen as an anticipated
outcome of the increase in complexity in the world network
economy that globalization has brought about. In the 70’s
stabilization policies designed to for example control in
inflation and unemployment using optimal control theory,
did not succeed [32, 33]. National economies became too
complex to be regulated with that toolset. Monetarist econ-
omists’ credo that the system itself could self-regulate with-
out any need to use an external controller was championed
by policy makers. The view that complexity was beneficial
for its stability was widely assumed in ecology studies, until
the 70s when the mathematical biologist Robert May dem-
onstrated that complexity might engender instability [34].
Apparently, economists were unaware of this work, as the
standard economic modeling of optimal forecasters in stable
equilibrium remained relatively undisputed until the 2008
financial crisis. Mainstream economic theory still relies upon
Newtonian mechanics and axioms and assumptions with not
empirical justification. Whether this is just an anachronism
or a mathematically-based ideology [35] constitutes a rich
discussion forum for the field of futures studies.
By focusing in the inverse problem we may reduce the
isolation of economic theories from the natural science, as it
provides an ideal platform where related problems from
different disciplines can be studied under a common ap-
proach with comparable results. The foundations of modern
economic theory e.g., efficient market hypothesis, rational
choice theory fueled by the “physics envy” of neo classical
economists has shown itself to be fatally flawed. We sorely
need to develop a new theoretical framework, based on
realistic scenarios in which the plurality of internal motiva-
tions of the economic agents (individuals, firms, institu-
tions), help us to establish a systemic understanding of
complex socio-economic systems.
New means to study quantities that are not directly ob-
servable like utility, drawing causal maps with measure-
ments gathered from financial economics, need to be scruti-
nized. By adopting an inverse perspective, we contribute to
the creation of new ways of economic thinking and to the
discovery of new tools to tackle inverse problems. In doing
so, the economic discipline will be emancipated from its ties
to XIX century physics to enter into a new paradigm shift. A
new picture of stability will emerge from the study of the
cognitive and ecological dimensions in economic systems,
grounded in the conceptual and methodological apparatus
provided by the inverse problem theory. This paper intends
to be a commencing contribution towards a new foundation
for complex economic systems modeling, sustained by a
plurality of future objectives to be undertaken in a multidis-
ciplinary and mathematically innovative way.
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